Ninth Circuit Limits Nationwide Fair Labor Standards Act Actions

If wage-and-hour litigation had a weather report, this one would read: partly cloudy, with a strong chance of forum-shopping headaches. In Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, the Ninth Circuit delivered a decision that narrows how far a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action can travel when it is filed in a forum where the employer is not “at home.” For employers, that sounds like a procedural win. For workers’ lawyers, it sounds like a nationwide case just got hit with a state border map and a red pen.

Still, this is not the death of nationwide FLSA litigation. It is more like a jurisdictional speed bump with sharp edges. The court limited nationwide notice in the case before it, but it also preserved the familiar two-step process for FLSA collectives and refused to force district courts to fully resolve arbitration fights before notice goes out. So the ruling matters, but it is not a total rewrite of wage-and-hour litigation. It is a reminder that in federal court, procedure is not the side dish. It is often the meal.

What Happened in the Cracker Barrel Case?

The lawsuit came from current and former Cracker Barrel employees who claimed the company violated the FLSA in the way it handled wages for tipped workers. The case was filed in Arizona, and the plaintiffs asked the district court to send notice to a broader group of servers in states where Cracker Barrel allegedly took a tip credit.

The district court approved preliminary certification and allowed notice to go out to a wider group of potential opt-in plaintiffs. That group included workers outside Arizona and workers whose claims might eventually be affected by arbitration agreements. Cracker Barrel appealed, arguing that the lower court had moved too far, too fast.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed three major issues. First, did the district court use the right framework for preliminary certification? Second, did the court have to decide arbitration issues before authorizing notice? Third, and most importantly, could an Arizona federal court approve notice to out-of-state workers whose claims had no meaningful tie to Arizona?

The Ninth Circuit answered that third question with a pretty clear “not so fast.”

The Core Holding: No Easy Path to a Nationwide FLSA Collective in Every Forum

The headline issue was personal jurisdiction. Cracker Barrel is based in Tennessee, not Arizona. That matters because there are two main kinds of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.

General jurisdiction is the broad kind. If a company is incorporated or headquartered in a state, courts there can usually hear a wide range of claims against it. Specific jurisdiction is narrower. It depends on whether the particular claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.

In Harrington, Arizona did not have general jurisdiction over Cracker Barrel. So the case lived or died on specific jurisdiction. That is where the Ninth Circuit leaned on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court. In that case, the Supreme Court said out-of-state plaintiffs could not piggyback their claims into California state court when those claims had no real connection to California.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the same logic applies in FLSA collective actions in federal court when the court is relying on specific jurisdiction. Translation: each opt-in plaintiff’s claim must have a sufficient connection to the forum state. One Arizona plaintiff cannot serve as a jurisdictional golden ticket for everyone else from across the country.

That holding sharply limits nationwide FLSA actions filed in states where the employer is not subject to general jurisdiction. If the opt-in workers’ claims do not connect to the forum, the court cannot simply wave them in because the alleged pay practice was similar nationwide.

Why the Ninth Circuit Reached That Result

The FLSA Does Not Have a Nationwide Service-of-Process Shortcut

A big part of the court’s reasoning was technical but important. The FLSA allows collective actions under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), but it does not contain a nationwide service-of-process provision. Because of that, the federal court had to look through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) to Arizona’s long-arm statute and the usual due process limits.

That is not just procedural trivia for the law-school outline crowd. It is the bridge that brought Bristol-Myers into the case. Without a nationwide service provision, the court said it had to apply the same kind of claim-by-claim jurisdiction analysis that would apply in a comparable state-court setting.

FLSA Collectives Are Not the Same as Rule 23 Class Actions

The workers argued that FLSA collective actions should be treated more like class actions, where courts often focus on the named plaintiffs and the structure of the action as a whole. The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded. It emphasized that FLSA collectives are not classic representative suits in the Rule 23 sense.

Instead, the court described FLSA collectives as closer to a mass action made up of individual plaintiffs with individual claims. That distinction did a lot of work in the opinion. If each worker is effectively a party plaintiff who must opt in, then each worker’s claim must independently satisfy jurisdictional requirements in a forum based on specific jurisdiction.

In plain English, the court treated the collective as a bundle of separate claims traveling together, not as one giant claim wearing a trench coat.

What the Ninth Circuit Did Not Do

The decision was a real limit on nationwide notice, but it was not a total employer sweep. In fact, the opinion delivered two important points that plaintiffs’ lawyers can still use.

The Two-Step Certification Process Survives

Employers have spent years arguing for a tougher standard at the notice stage. The Ninth Circuit declined to scrap the familiar two-step approach. It said its own precedent in Campbell v. City of Los Angeles already endorsed that framework, and district courts in the circuit remain free to use it.

That matters because preliminary certification in an FLSA case is still intended to be an early-stage screening device, not a full-dress trial on the merits. Plaintiffs still have a road to conditional notice. The road is just narrower when out-of-state opt-ins are involved.

Arbitration Does Not Have to Be Fully Resolved Before Notice

Cracker Barrel also argued that notice should not go to workers whose claims might be subject to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit took a more practical view. It said district courts do not have to conclusively decide arbitrability for every absent worker before notice goes out, especially where factual disputes remain.

That holding keeps courts from turning the notice stage into a mini-arbitration festival. It also recognizes the reality that in many workplace cases, the existence, scope, or enforceability of arbitration agreements is contested.

Why This Ruling Matters for Employers

Employers now have a stronger defense against broad, multi-state FLSA collective actions filed in Ninth Circuit courts when they are not incorporated or headquartered in the forum state. That can reduce exposure, shrink the size of potential collectives, and make litigation more predictable.

It also makes forum selection more important. Plaintiffs may no longer be able to file in a perceived favorable forum and then sweep in workers from all over the country with claims that have no forum connection. From a defense perspective, that is a major win because nationwide notice can dramatically increase settlement pressure, discovery burdens, and reputational risk.

In short, the ruling gives employers a better chance to argue that wage-and-hour cases should be fought on a more local map.

Why This Ruling Matters for Employees and Plaintiffs’ Counsel

On the other side, the opinion raises practical costs for workers. One reason FLSA collectives matter is that many wage claims are too small to pursue alone. A broad collective can make those claims economically viable. When courts chop up a nationwide theory into state-connected pieces, workers may need to file in multiple forums or sue in the employer’s home state instead.

That fragmentation can mean more expense, more delay, and more inconsistent outcomes. It can also weaken the leverage that comes from one coordinated case addressing a companywide policy. That is why worker-side advocates have argued that limiting nationwide collectives undercuts the FLSA’s remedial purpose.

So yes, this is a procedural opinion. But in wage-and-hour law, “procedural” often decides whether real people can afford to bring real cases at all.

Does This End Nationwide FLSA Actions?

No. It limits them, but it does not erase them.

A nationwide FLSA collective may still be possible in a forum where the employer is subject to general jurisdiction, typically where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. Plaintiffs can also structure litigation around state-specific or region-specific groups, or file parallel cases in multiple jurisdictions if necessary. None of those options are as tidy as one nationwide action in a handpicked forum, but they are still options.

There is also still a circuit split. Before the Ninth Circuit weighed in, the First Circuit had taken the more plaintiff-friendly view, while the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had applied Bristol-Myers to FLSA collectives. The Ninth Circuit joined that majority side of the split. The Supreme Court later declined to review the Cracker Barrel case, which means the disagreement remains alive and well, like a houseguest who keeps saying they are leaving and then sits back down.

A Practical Example of the Decision’s Impact

Imagine a restaurant chain based in Tennessee with locations in Arizona, California, Nevada, and Florida. A server in Arizona sues in federal court in Arizona, alleging the company used an unlawful tip-credit practice nationwide. Before Harrington, the plaintiffs might have argued that because the named Arizona plaintiff had a valid Arizona-connected claim, the court could authorize notice to similarly situated workers everywhere.

After Harrington, that argument is much weaker in the Ninth Circuit. If the court has only specific jurisdiction, it must ask whether each opt-in worker’s claim has a sufficient connection to Arizona. A Florida server’s claim based on work performed only in Florida will likely face a jurisdiction problem in Arizona federal court. Same policy, same alleged violation, different forum link. That distinction is now doing major legal labor.

The Bigger Picture for Wage-and-Hour Litigation

The Ninth Circuit’s decision fits a broader national trend: appellate courts are treating personal jurisdiction as a serious gatekeeper, not an afterthought. For years, many wage-and-hour cases assumed the real action would center on certification standards, exemption rules, tip-credit practices, and damages models. Those issues still matter. But Harrington shows that the fight can now start even earlier, with judges asking a simple but powerful question: why this court for these plaintiffs?

That shift will affect filing strategy, motion practice, settlement leverage, and case design. Plaintiffs’ firms will think more carefully about where to file. Employers will press jurisdictional arguments earlier and harder. District courts will spend more time sorting out who belongs in the case before the merits even begin to stretch their legs.

For anyone tracking FLSA collective actions, the lesson is clear: geography is no longer background scenery. It is part of the plot.

Conclusion

Harrington is a significant Ninth Circuit decision because it narrows the path to nationwide Fair Labor Standards Act actions in forums where the employer is not at home. The court held that specific personal jurisdiction must be analyzed claim by claim for opt-in plaintiffs, which means nationwide notice is no longer automatic just because one named plaintiff has a valid in-state claim.

At the same time, the ruling is not a total shutdown of collective litigation. The Ninth Circuit preserved the two-step certification process and refused to require courts to fully decide arbitration issues before notice. That makes this case less of a demolition and more of a remodel. The front door is still there, but it now has a stricter guest list.

For employers, this is a meaningful tool to resist sprawling FLSA cases in plaintiff-selected forums. For workers, it is a reminder that access to collective enforcement may depend more heavily on where a suit is filed. For lawyers on both sides, one thing is obvious: the next great wage-and-hour battle may not be about overtime math. It may be about the map.

Experiences From the Real World: How This Decision Changes the Feel of an FLSA Case

In practice, decisions like Harrington do more than change briefing strategy. They change the entire mood of a case. Before a ruling like this, a plaintiffs’ lawyer might look at a companywide pay practice and think in national terms right away: one complaint, one notice plan, one collective, one settlement conversation with enough scale to matter. After Harrington, that same lawyer has to think more like an air-traffic controller. Which forum has general jurisdiction? Which workers have claims tied to the forum? Which states may need separate filings? Suddenly the litigation plan is less “big tent” and more “carefully arranged folding chairs.”

For workers, the experience can be frustrating in a very human way. Many FLSA claims are not gigantic on an individual level. A server, technician, driver, or assistant manager may be owed meaningful money, but not enough to justify a solo federal lawsuit that drags on for years. Collective actions solve that economic problem by letting many workers move together. When a court limits the size of that group, the legal issue sounds abstract, but the practical effect is immediate: some workers may be told they cannot join the case where it was filed, even though they say the employer used the same pay policy on them too. That feels strange to nonlawyers, and honestly, you can see why.

For employers and HR teams, the experience is almost the mirror image. A nationwide collective action can create intense pressure fast. The potential group gets larger, the document preservation burden balloons, managers across multiple states get pulled into interviews, and settlement numbers start lifting weights in the background. A jurisdictional ruling that trims the case back to forum-connected claims can feel like finally getting the emergency brake to work. The company still has to defend the allegations, but the battlefield is smaller and the risk is easier to model.

Judges experience this differently too. Trial courts managing FLSA cases often want efficient procedures that avoid turning the notice stage into a full merits showdown. Harrington preserves some of that flexibility by keeping the two-step process alive and by not forcing conclusive arbitration decisions before notice. But it also tells judges they cannot ignore personal jurisdiction just because a collective action seems administratively convenient. In other words, judicial efficiency still matters, but constitutional limits get the last word.

The biggest real-world takeaway is that this decision makes wage-and-hour litigation more strategic and more fragmented at the same time. Plaintiffs’ lawyers will file more carefully. Defense lawyers will challenge forum reach more aggressively. Workers may see more state-focused or employer-home-state cases instead of one nationwide action in a preferred forum. And everyone involved will spend a little more time studying the map before arguing about the paycheck.